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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Martin Rodriguez pied guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol
("DUI"). After serving a successful period of retained jurisdiction and being placed on probation,
he filed a motion with the district court asserting that the driver's license suspension portion of
his sentence was illegal. In denying that motion, the district court ruled that the license
suspension in this case was consecutive to the license suspension in a prior unrelated case. The
court reasoned that because the license suspension term of the judgment of conviction in this
case was silent as to whether it was concurrent with, or consecutive to, the suspension in the
prior case, it was necessarily consecutive to that in the prior case. Mr. Rodriguez appeals,
asserting that the district court erred in retrospectively ruling that the license suspension in this
case is consecutive to the suspension in the prior case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Just before Christmas 2017, Mr. Rodriguez was pulled over for a number of traffic
violations. (PSI, p.9.) After failing a breathalyzer test, and the officer learning there were two
active warrants for his arrest, Mr. Rodriguez was arrested. (PSI, p.9.) Mr. Rodriguez was
subsequently charged with felony driving under the influence and driving without privileges.
(R., pp.8-9.)

Mr. Rodriguez then pied guilty to felony DUI, in exchange for, among other things, the
State dismissing the driving without privileges charge and recommending the court retain
jurisdiction. (R., pp.32-33.) Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with
three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.36-39.) That prison sentence was

1

ordered to "run concurrently with all other sentences currently being served." 1 (R., p.37.)
Mr. Rodriguez's driver's license was also suspended for five years, with two and one-half years
absolute, with that suspension ordered stayed during any period of time he may be incarcerated.
(R., pp.37-38.) The judgment of conviction was silent as to whether the license suspension in this
case was concurrent with, or consecutive to, the license suspension in Mr. Rodriguez's prior,
unrelated case. (See R., pp.37-38.)
Following a successful period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
Mr. Rodriguez's sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. (R., pp.47-52.) The order
suspending his sentence reiterated the original terms of the driver's license suspension. (See
R., p.48.) As such, it was still silent as to whether the license suspension in this case was
concurrent with, or consecutive to, the license suspension in Mr. Rodriguez's prior, unrelated
case. (See R., p.48.)
Thereafter, Mr. Rodriguez filed a prose motion to correct an illegal sentence under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(a). (R., pp.62-68.) 2 Although Mr. Rodriguez's motion is exceptionally difficult
to follow, it appears to have argued that the district court's recitation of the terms of the driver's
license suspension in its order suspending his sentence and placing him on probation rendered
the sentence illegal insofar as it failed to give him credit against the license suspension for the
time he spent in prison during his rider. (See R., pp.62-68.) Mr. Rodriguez reasoned that,
1

At the time Mr. Rodriguez was arrested in this case, he was on probation for felony DUI in Ada
County Case Number CR-FE-2014-14732 ("the other case"). (See R., pp.82-84.) The charges in
this case were the basis for a probation revocation in the other case. (See R., pp.82-83.) Upon
having his probation revoked in that case, Mr. Rodriguez received a period of retained
jurisdiction that was concurrent with that which was ultimately imposed in this case.
(PSI, p.268.) Following the concurrent rider, the jurisdiction was relinquished in the prior case.
(R., p.84.)
2
Mr. Rodriguez also filed various motions asking for conflict counsel, an evidentiary hearing,
and court fees. (See R., pp.55-61.) He does not contest the court's denial of those motions.
(R., pp.79-81.)
2

although Idaho Code section 18-8011 explicitly provides that a court-ordered driver's license
suspension commences only after the defendant's "release from confmement or imprisonment,"
and "shall cease to run if the [defendant] is reincarcerated" and remain "stayed for the entire
period the individual is reincarcerated," this provision only applies to defendants incarcerated at
county jails, not state prisons. (See R., pp.64-65, 66, 67.)
The district court denied Mr. Rodriguez's motion. (R., pp.81-84.) In doing so, however, it
misunderstood the arguments presented in Mr. Rodriguez's motion. It misconstrued them as a
challenge to the aggregate length of the driver's license suspensions, assuming the suspension in
this case was consecutive to the suspension in Mr. Rodriguez's prior case:
From what the Court can gamer of Defendant's confusing argument, Defendant
requests the Court correct his driver's license suspension to not run beyond five
years. Apparently, Defendant's driver's license is suspended beyond five years as
a result of a driver's license suspension imposed in this case and another case,
Ada County Case Number CR-FE-2014-14732.
(R., p.82.) The court then went on to calculate the amount of time left on the suspensions in both
the prior case ("a little less than three years"), and this case ( five years, because the "license
suspension never started running in this case as he has not yet been released from
incarceration"), and it concluded, "Once [Mr. Rodriguez] is re leased, his driver's license
suspension will total a little less than eight years due to the convictions he has accumulated in
both cases." (R., pp.82-84.) The district court added the two license suspensions together to
come up with an aggregate total of nearly eight years because, "Neither Judgment provided that
the driver's license suspensions were to run concurrent[ly]." (R., p.84.) In other words, the
district court implicitly ruled as a matter of law that where judgments of conviction fail to
designate driver's license suspensions as being concurrent, they are necessarily consecutive.
Mr. Rodriguez timely appealed the district court's denial of his motion. (R., pp.86-88.)
On appeal, he contends the district court erred in ruling that the failure of a judgment of
3

conviction to designate a driver's license suspension as concurrent to any other suspensions
requires that it be treated as consecutive.

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err in ruling that when a judgment of conviction is silent as to whether a
driver's license suspension under Idaho Code § 18-8005 is consecutive to, or concurrent with,
suspensions from prior cases, that suspension is deemed to be consecutive?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Ruling That When A Judgment Of Conviction Is Silent As To
Whether A Driver's License Suspension Under Idaho Code§ 18-8005 Is Consecutive To, Or
Concurrent With, Suspensions From Prior Cases, That Suspension Is Deemed To Be
Consecutive
A.

Introduction
Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the district court erred when it ruled, as a matter oflaw, that

when the sentencing court is silent as to whether a license suspension is to be concurrent or
consecutive to suspensions from prior cases, it is necessarily consecutive. The license suspension
provision ofldaho's DUI statute does not support such a conclusion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free

review [and] the standard of review for statutory interpretation applies." Kenworth Sales Co. v.
Skinner Trucking, Inc., 165 Idaho 938, 943 (2019) (quoting Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Lopez,

163 Idaho 281, 283 (2018)).

C.

A Driver's License Suspension Under Idaho Code § 18-8005 Is Not, By Default,
Consecutive To Prior Suspensions
Idaho Code § 18-8005(6)(d) requires a court sentencing a defendant for felony DUI to

suspend the defendant's driving privileges absolutely for one year, and it permits the court to
suspend his driving privileges for up to four additional years. LC. § 18-8005(6)(d). License
suspensions imposed under§ 18-8005(6)(d) must commence to run upon the defendant's release
from incarceration. LC. § 18-8011. Neither section 18-8005(6)(d), nor section 18-8011,
expressly permits a sentencing court to impose consecutive license suspensions where the
defendant has multiple DUI convictions. In fact, the statutes suggest consecutive suspensions are

6

impermissible. Section 18-8011 states that the suspension period "is to commence after that
individual's release from confinement or imprisonment," and, if he is reincarcerated, ''will
recommence as of the date the individual is rereleased from confinement or imprisonment."
I. C. § 18-8011. Thus, any license suspension must begin running "[u ]pon the individual's release

from confinement or imprisonment," and will not - and cannot - be stayed while the defendant
serves another license suspension in another case. LC. § 18-8011.
However, even if it is assumed that consecutive license suspensions are permitted under
Idaho law, in the judgment of conviction, the district court did not even purport to impose a
consecutive suspension. Rather, it simply stated:
Defendant's driver's license is suspended for a total of five (5) years,
commencing upon defendant's release from incarceration. Defendant shall have
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind for the first two and one-half (2 1/2)
years. Defendant may be eligible for restricted privileges for the last two and onehalf (2 1/2) years.
(R., pp.37-38 (emphasis m original).) Importantly, the court then stated that the license
suspension "shall be stayed" if Mr. Rodriguez was reincarcerated, and that the suspension would
only be stayed "for the duration of any such reincarceration." (R., p.38 (citing LC. § 18-8011).)
Clearly, a consecutive license suspension was not ordered as part of Mr. Rodriguez' sentence.
Nevertheless, after Mr. Rodriguez completed his rider and filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, the district court retrospectively characterized the license suspension in this case
as consecutive to the suspension imposed in the other case. (See R., pp.81-84.) The court
reasoned that, because "[n]either Judgment provided that the driver's license suspensions were to
run concurrent," those suspensions must necessarily be consecutive. (R., p.84; see also p.84 n.1
("If Defendant has convictions in other cases, those cases could also affect the length of

Defendant's driver's license suspension.").)
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That is an erroneous statement of law. Even where consecutive sentences are expressly
permitted by statute - such as is the case with imprisonment, see LC. § 18-3083

-

the failure to

"specify whether a sentence is to be served concurrently with or consecutive to another sentence"
does not, by default, make it consecutive; rather, "in the absence of a specification that it is to be
consecutive, the defendant's service of the sentence will begin immediately." State v. Bosier, 149
Idaho 664, 667 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus, even if the sentencing court had the authority to impose a
consecutive driver's license suspension under LC. § 18-8005(6)(d), the fact is that it simply did
not do so here. Accordingly, the district court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that
Mr. Rodriguez's license suspension in this case must run consecutively to the suspension in the
other case.
Further, the district court's ruling in response to Mr. Rodriguez's Rule 35(a) motion had
the impermissible effect of increasing his sentence beyond that which was originally
pronounced. When a sentence has already been imposed, the district court does not have
jurisdiction to later "withdraw its original sentence" and impose a longer sentence. State v. West,
105 Idaho 505, 507 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Pedraza, 101 Idaho 440, 441 (1980)). Later
cases held that this constraint includes converting a "sentence from one that was to be served
concurrently to one that will run consecutive to other sentences" because that "increases the

3

This section states:
When any person is convicted of two (2) or more crimes before sentence has been
pronounced upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is sentenced upon
the second or other subsequent conviction, in the discretion of the court, may
commence at the termination of the first term of imprisonment to which he shall
be adjudged, or at the termination of the second or other subsequent term of
imprisonment, as the case may be.

LC. § 18-308.
8

aggregate term" of the initially imposed sentence. Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668; see also State v.

Mendenhall, 106 Idaho 388, 394 (Ct. App. 1984).
Applying the rationale from West, the district court no longer had jurisdiction to change
the underlying sentence as Mr. Rodriguez "actually had commenced his probation to the Board
of Correction." West, 105 Idaho at 507. The district court's "power was constrained by Pedraza"
and it could not later "increase the term of [the license suspension.]" West, 105 Idaho at 507; see

also Bosier, 149 Idaho at 668.
For these reasons, this Court should vacate the district court's order characterizing the
license suspension in this case as consecutive to that which was imposed in the other case, and it
should remand this case to the district court for consideration of Mr. Rodriguez's motion in light
of the proper legal standards.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2020.

I sf R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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